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ABSTRACT 
Activities for individuals, organizations, and government agencies 
to plan for, protect from, and respond to cases of emergency or attack 
generally focus on paper and pencil planning sessions that don’t include 
computer simulated information or decision data.  Modeling critical 
infrastructures and cyber physical systems has become a growing 
research area, as well as a common theme in training activities for cyber 
security practitioners and first responders over the past decade.  One 
approach to modeling multiple critical infrastructures is to model all critical 
infrastructures in a single environment by converting them into a single 
standard protocol and implementing them in a single testbed.   
This dissertation provides the road map of how the Critical 
Infrastructure Modeling and Response Environment (CIMoRE) could be 
developed to allow all critical infrastructure subsectors to be modeled in a 
single TCP/IP testbed.  The Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation 
Environment (ISEAGE) is the testbed that was used as the backbone of 
this framework. 
This dissertation addresses three main problems with using a 
unified TCP/IP testbed for modeling.  First, the physical world critical 
infrastructure subsectors must be turned into network representations of 
themselves.  This includes transforming the characteristics of their traffic 
into TCP/IP traffic and node data, as well as representing 
interdependencies between the critical infrastructure subsectors.  Second, 
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the ISEAGE testbed, its operational software ISEFLOW, and the 
ISEFLOW configuration file needed to be modified to allow for critical 
infrastructure subsector modeling.  Additionally, the concept of network 
delay had to be added to ISEAGE.  And, third, concept of traffic 
generation had to be added to ISEAGE to allow modeling of increases and 
decreases of traffic volumes for critical infrastructure subsectors.  Along 
with traffic generation is the need to introduce events that simulate real 
world disruptions that could stem from that traffic generation.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade the modeling of critical infrastructures and cyber 
physical systems has become a growing research area, as well as a 
common theme in training activities for cyber security practitioners and 
first responders.  On a national front the government is worried about the 
actions of nation states or hackactivists against critical infrastructures 
including services such as water treatment systems and power grid, 
physical structures such as bridges and buildings, and communication 
systems such as data networks, control systems, and information 
systems.  On a state level Iowa has the Air National Guard charged with a 
homeland security cyber operations and protection mission and the State 
of Iowa using a testbed to model its computer and information systems for 
cyber security testing and protection.  Even current events such as natural 
disasters like hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria focus attention on 
planning activities to anticipate outages of critical services, predict 
damages, recover systems gracefully, and rebuild what is necessary.   
Training for individuals, organizations, and government agencies to 
plan for, protect from, and respond to cases of emergency or attack can 
be a daunting task.  Most training is completed as table top exercises with 
multiple state, federal, and local organizations sending participants.  In 
these exercises it is hard to replicate the volume of data to be analyzed 
and with which decisions need to be made, sometimes in a matter of 
minutes, that a real event generates.  In some exercises the paper and 
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pencil activities are coupled with computer simulation information output 
from multiple, disparate computer systems that each has its own critical 
infrastructure as its focus.  The computer simulated information currently 
is a disjointed approach in modeling and, generally, are single sector 
specific.  During the table top exercises, as well as during a real event, 
creating a response requires a large amount of human effort and decision-
making which may or may not correctly estimate how the interdependent, 
and sometimes conflicting, failing systems impact each other.  A poor 
decision can lead to cascading events further degrading the critical 
infrastructure or impacting a different one.   
One approach to solving the problem of multiple computer 
modeling systems each focused on its own critical infrastructure is to 
model all critical infrastructures in a single environment by converting 
them into a single standard protocol and implementing them in a single 
testbed.  Fortunately, at Iowa State University, there is access to a flexible 
and highly configurable Internet testbed that was developed for cyber 
security research.  The Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation 
Environment (ISEAGE – pronounced ice age) provides a scalable and 
resilient testbed in which to create the Critical Infrastructure Modeling and 
Response Environment (CIMoRE – pronounced “see more”) tool.  This 
dissertation provides the framework needed to modify the ISEAGE 
environment for the modeling of multiple critical infrastructures at the 
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same time using a single Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) testbed. 
This dissertation is organized into 5 sections.  Chapter 1 includes 
the brief overview presented above.  Chapter 2 provides the definitions 
used when discussing critical infrastructures.  Chapter 3 outlines previous 
literature on critical infrastructure modeling.  Chapter 4 provides the scope 
of work.  Chapter 5 shows how a physical critical infrastructure is turned 
into a network representation.  Chapter 6 enumerates the changes in 
ISEAGE that must occur before CIMoRE can be fully functional.  Chapter 
7 shows how CIMoRE functions.  Chapter 8 contains the conclusions and 
future work.   
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CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS 
Before reviewing the literature, converting critical infrastructure 
systems to network nodes, enumerating the modifications needed in 
ISEAGE, and depicting how CIMoRE operates, it is important to provide 
definitions of the terms and concepts that will be used repeatedly in this 
dissertation.   
Critical Infrastructures 
This dissertation uses the federal government’s definition of critical 
infrastructures.  Found in the U.S. Patriot Act critical infrastructures are 
defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters” [1].  The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), updated 
in 2013, categorized these systems and assets into 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors that provide services vital to make everyday life 
occur for the nation and for its people.  These are complex and highly 
interdependent systems, networks, and physical assets that are essential 
to physical well-being, as well as to a way of life.  The 16 categories are 
chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical manufacturing; 
dams; defense industrial base; emergency services; energy; financial 
services; food and agriculture; government facilities; healthcare and public 
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health; information technology; nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; 
transportation systems; and water and wastewater systems [2].   
Each of the 16 sectors is very complex with many subsectors.  The 
sectors and subsectors can have varying complexities and relationships 
between and among them.  And, the subsectors may be owned in a more 
regional manner by multiple companies, wholly by a single company, or 
owned and managed by a government entity.   Fig. 1. shows 
transportation and energy sectors.  In the transportation sector alone there 
are seven subsectors (or modes of movement) including aviation; highway 
and motor carrier; maritime transportation; mass transit and passenger 
rail; pipeline systems; freight rail; and postal and shipping.  And, within the 
highway and motor carrier infrastructure subsector there are more than 4 
million miles of roads, 600,000 bridges and 350 tunnels.  Using those road 
are vehicles including automobiles, motorcycles, trucks carrying 
hazardous materials, other commercial freight vehicles, motorcoaches, 
and school buses [3].  Likewise, the energy sector has three subsectors: 
electricity, oil, and natural gas [4].   
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Fig.  1. Example of sectors and subsectors using transportation and energy 
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Dependencies  
Dependencies in a sector or subsector are generally well-defined 
and known by the owners of the infrastructure.  A dependency is a one 
directional relationship between the two subsectors.  It can be thought of 
as a link between the two subsectors where the functioning (or non-
functioning) of the subsector affects the ability of the second subsector to 
provide its normal services.   
Fig. 2 shows the singular relationship found in a dependency.  For 
example, approximately 48% of electricity generated in the nation is 
created by burning coal.  The majority of the coal arrives at the generation 
plants by freight trains.  Therefore, there is a dependency in the electricity 
subsector on freight trains to deliver coal on time to keep the generators 
working [5].  These are one dimensional relationships which do not truly 
manifest themselves this simply in the real world.  In reality the 
relationships among and between the sectors and subsectors are much 
more complicated.   
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Fig.  2. Dependency of electricity on delivery of coal by freight trains 
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Interdependencies 
Identifying and organizing the interdependencies between and 
among critical infrastructures is a much larger problem and harder to 
quantify that the simplistic dependency described above.  “An 
interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between infrastructures 
through which the state of each infrastructure is influenced by or 
correlated to the state of the other” [6].     
Fig. 3 illustrates the complexity of interdependencies.  Above it was 
argued that electricity generation, so the electricity subsector, had a 
dependency on the transportation subsector of freight trains.  However, 
freight trains rely upon diesel fuel to power their engines, thus the freight 
rail subsector relies on the energy subsector of oil.  The transportation 
subsector of pipelines is the primary distribution system for oil across the 
nation to refineries where the diesel fuel is manufactured. The diesel fuel 
is then distributed by tractor and trailer to the rail yard for the trains to 
refuel. And it takes electricity to pump the diesel fuel into the train engines.   
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Fig.  3. Interdependencies of transportation and energy sectors 
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Two very similar taxonomies have been developed to organize and 
classify interdependencies by the types of relationships or influences they 
have on each other.  [7] provided four general classifications to categorize 
interdependencies:  
• Physical – dependence on another infrastructure for material 
inputs/outputs 
• Cyber – dependence on information transmitted through a network 
• Geographic – close spatial proximity  
• Logical – does not fall into one of the other classifications 
A second, a very similar classification, was developed by [8].  This 
second classification provides three of the four previously presented 
categories, albeit with different names, and expands the taxonomy by 
dividing the “other” bucket into two groups; policy and societal:   
• Physical – a connection from one infrastructure to another in terms 
of supply or production 
• Informational – a control mechanism between two infrastructures or 
their components   
• Geospatial – relationship based upon physical closeness of the 
entities 
• Policy/Procedural – a policy change in one infrastructure affects the 
second  
12 
 
 
• Societal – the consequence of an infrastructure having an impact 
on public opinion, public confidence, fear, or cultural issues  
The example depicted in Fig. 3 illustrates the physical 
interdependency category with relationships between electricity, oil, freight 
rail, pipeline systems, and highway and motor carrier subsectors being 
shown.   
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CHAPTER 3.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Current critical infrastructure simulation software products available 
through government resources and private parties, as well as academic 
research, sift themselves into a dichotomy.  Those that treat critical 
infrastructures as separate entities using different frameworks and metrics 
and those that attempt to model multiple critical infrastructures at the 
same time.  While both approaches have proven useful in the past, the 
CIMoRE project attempts to improve upon the second category by building 
on a single framework, including their interdependencies in the modeling, 
and allowing the interjection of disruptive events during the modeling.   
Modeling a Single Critical Infrastructure 
The first group of modeling software makes no attempt to model 
multiple critical infrastructure sectors.  It treats each infrastructure sector 
(transportation systems, energy, information technology, etc.) separately 
using differing frameworks and metrics.  Treatment of critical 
infrastructures as standalone entities is not representative of the true 
world and provides little useful information in planning, protecting, and 
responding to events.  They do serve a purpose, however, to discover the 
small details needed to be known to model an infrastructure before any 
more complex modeling can be taken.   
This is the historical approach to studying critical infrastructures.  
Modeling one infrastructure, or one subsector, in its entirety.  Each work 
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focuses singularly on one critical infrastructure subsector such as roads, 
bridges, telecommunications systems, cyber networks, power grids, rail 
systems, or water treatment facilities.  Each critical infrastructure sector, 
and many times subsector, is treated as a system unto itself.  Each uses 
its own, different, methodology to model, test and resolve the threats 
presented to it.   
Examples of singularly focused works include systems that 
visualize road closures and alternate routes for traffic, but only look at 
surface transportation on primary roads [9]; transportation planning 
software programs that include multiple types of traffic (road, rail and 
public transportation), but only allow one type to be viewed at a time; or 
congestion relief models and rider/driver demand modeling softwares.  
This type of traffic simulation is used primarily for urban planning and 
transportation infrastructure planning [10].  An additional example of 
singularly focused software includes flood prediction programs that 
estimate the breaches of the levees and when levels will contaminate 
water supplies, but don’t show damage to other methods of transportation 
or damage to buildings, lives and personal property [11]. Further, early 
work done on the power grid has been singularly focused [12, 13].  Each 
of these types of programs use a different format to model the critical 
infrastructure pieces and is compartmentalized with no data used beyond 
that sector or subsector.  The different modeling techniques inhibit the 
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overlay of information and make interdependencies and relationships 
between and among the subsectors difficult to predict or measure.    
While studying one infrastructure or subsector at a time simplifies 
the problem, it does not reflect the real world and does not provide a 
holistic approach for disaster preparedness.  In addition to being too 
singularly focused on one sector, these works do not account for 
interdependencies between critical infrastructure sectors which represent 
the complexity of the physical world.  While critical infrastructures 
subsectors can be owned and maintained by the government such as 
interstates, highways, and bridges, a majority of them are privately held 
companies such as power plants, oil refineries, telecommunications 
companies.  Historically, each of these infrastructure subsector owners is 
concerned primarily with the continuity of their business and focus on their 
own well-defined area of control, thus, the past approach of studying a 
single infrastructure or subsector.  However, the growing reliance upon 
network connectivity, as well as unforeseen secondary effects from the 
failure of another critical infrastructure, has these owners interested in 
studying interdependencies and modeling multiple critical infrastructures 
as well [8].  Therefore, more recent work attempts to study multiple critical 
infrastructures and account for their interdependencies.  However, this 
field of study is still very much in its infancy.   
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Modeling Multiple Critical Infrastructures 
The second approach tries to model multiple infrastructures, 
however, within this group there are two methodological approaches to the 
problem of combining very different critical infrastructure sectors or 
subsectors. In reviewing models that are currently under development in 
the U.S., two different approaches were taken to allow multiple 
infrastructures to be included [8].  One coupled a series of simulations 
together; taking output from one model and providing it as input to 
another.  The other approach is to try to find common underpinnings and 
base the modeling on those commonalities.  The first approach, called the 
coupled model, tends to handle more specific details of the critical 
infrastructure subsectors it is modeling because each is modeled 
separately and then the output passed on.  The second model, called an 
integrated model, generally works at a higher level of abstraction and 
doesn’t handle the details of the subsector as well.   
Coupled Model 
 The first type of modeling is to couple simulations that model a 
single infrastructure sector.  In this case, the output of one model may be 
fed into another model as input.  In this way, multiple infrastructure sectors 
are included.  This could be useful, but there is a lag in the creation of the 
input, as well as needed to make the different systems transparently pass 
information from one to the other.  Any transformations of the output of 
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one system before being used as input to the next modeling system 
requires processing time and potentially human interaction.   
There are no standards that exist for cross infrastructure modeling.  
In a coupled model, however, there are two widely accepted methods for 
exchanging information between simulations:  the High Level Architecture 
(HLA) and the Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS).  HLA was 
developed to allow interoperability between a large number of simulations 
used by the Department of Defense.  It allows multiple types of models 
and simulations to exchange data in real-time.  It is an open source, 
general purpose simulation architecture specified as IEEE Standard 1516 
[14].  HLA uses federations of different kinds of interactive members.  
These interactive members, called federates, communicate using services 
provided by the infrastructure.  The publisher role allows a member to 
send information into the infrastructure and the subscriber role provides a 
way to receive the information. All is implemented in XML and all 
communication is real-time. 
HLA has been more widely used to implement distributed critical 
infrastructures such as air traffic control and vessel traffic systems [15]; 
electric grid and its SCADA systems [16]; and telecommunications, railway 
and electric systems [17].  A similar publish-subscribe communication 
paradigm is called Quality of Service Descriptors that has been 
implemented in a grid architecture for the electrical grid to aid in 
information sharing among critical infrastructures [18]. 
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The DIS framework is also real-time and allows distributed 
simulations.  It is IEEE Standard 1278 [19] and was created to allow virtual 
simulations of warfare by interconnecting distributed 
computers/simulators.  Both HLA and DIS are designed to pass data 
between models with synchronized timing.  Other methods of exchanging 
data between simulations are XML and GIS shapes files [20]. 
Integrated Model 
The second type of modeling is to identify an underlying 
commonality on which several critical infrastructures can be modeled.  
While this approach provides an integrated model that has shown better 
results than those modeled as single sectors [8], few of these programs 
allow the import of measurements from ongoing, real-time events. Further, 
knowledge of interdependencies between the infrastructure sectors is 
relatively immature and there is no standard for multiple critical 
infrastructure sector evaluation [6].  It is within this concept of creating a 
single, comprehensive framework to integrate different critical 
infrastructures, their interdependencies, and real-time physical data is 
where the fully implemented CIMoRE tool provides an advantage.  
When considering integrated models, there are not even accepted 
methods to follow.  The most interesting previous integrated work found 
that used both multiple infrastructures and interdependencies was a model 
created by [21] that used an agent-based approach to model the levels of 
critical infrastructures and their interdependencies as a large graph.  The 
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nodes in the graph are used to represent infrastructure components and 
the edges are the connections between the nodes.  The nodes could be 
connected or disjoint.  The edges may be directional, bi-directional, or 
both.    
Because CIMoRE will model multiple critical subsectors at the 
same time in a single TCP/IP network, its development falls into the group 
of work focused on finding commonalities in subsectors.  However, it 
differs from that work in definition of commonalities.  Previous work 
focused on finding commonalities in the physical world in which the critical 
infrastructure subsectors exist.  CIMoRE requires that the subsectors be 
transformed into networks.  Because [21-25] opted to model critical 
infrastructures as nodes and their interdependencies as a set of 
connected graphs with traffic intensity and payload redistributions [22] , it 
logically follows that critical infrastructure subsectors can be expressed as 
an interconnected IP network topology.  An interconnected IP network is 
just another way to draw multiple critical infrastructures and their 
interdependencies.  However, CIMoRE goes beyond the previous work by 
using a functioning Internet testbed and an IP network topology, disruptive 
events can be easily introduced and nodes quickly reconfigured to 
accommodate for failing states dues to multiple events.  [21] readily admit 
in their graph model is a discrete event simulator because it cannot not 
accommodate multiple events or input data.  CIMoRE built upon the 
ISEAGE testbed will be able to allow both when fully functional.       
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CHAPTER 4. SCOPE OF WORK 
To allow multiple critical infrastructures to be modeled in a single 
interconnected IP network testbed, all physical critical infrastructure 
subsectors and their corresponding real-time physical data must be 
transformed into IP network nodes, IP traffic and node data, and IP node 
relationships in this framework.  Once the transformations are completed, 
the ISEAGE testbed needs to be modified to provide the ability to model 
and represent the subsector data and network representations.  Finally, 
the ability to insert disruptive events into the model must be provided.  
This dissertation serves as the foundation for a full implementation 
of CIMoRE.  It provides the framework for converting subsector data into 
network data, as well as the changes needed to the ISEAGE environment 
to allow modeling of multiple subsectors at the same time using a single 
testbed.  The three primary problems it addresses are 
1. Turning the physical world critical infrastructure subsectors into 
network representations of themselves.  This includes transforming 
the characteristics of their traffic into TCP/IP traffic and node data. 
It also includes the representations of relationships or 
interdependencies between critical infrastructures in networking 
terms.  Further, it means determining what normal traffic looks like 
in those critical infrastructure subsectors and what an abnormally 
high level of traffic would look like.   
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2. Modifying ISEAGE, its operational software ISEFLOW, and the 
ISEFLOW configuration file to handle critical infrastructure 
modeling.  Differentiating between types of traffic and introducing 
the concept of latency are all concerns in using the ISEAGE 
testbed for modeling critical infrastructure subsectors. 
3. Providing for a way to increase and decrease traffic on the 
routers in the critical infrastructure subsectors, as well as 
introducing events that simulate real world disruptions.  These 
disruptions could be increased use of subsector resources, node 
failure due to resource stress in the subsector, initial disruption in 
the subsector such as an attack.  Additionally, the concept of 
recovery from a failed state is addressed.   
The scope of CIMoRE's development in this dissertation is to create 
the framework for three of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors:  
transportation, information technology, and energy. And, to more narrowly 
define the scope of work, three subsectors, one within each of the critical 
infrastructure sectors, were selected:  the highway system, the 
communications network, and the power distribution system.  To further 
reduce the amount of scope of work, the State of Iowa was selected as 
the geographic area to cover.  Specially, the two major Interstates that cut 
across the State of Iowa, I-80 and I-35, are used for the highway system 
work.  The Iowa Communications Network (ICN) is used to represent the 
communications network subsector, while the electric grid in the State of 
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Iowa is used for the electricity subsector.  To make the configurations 
readable for this dissertation, one physical “network” of each type will be 
depicted in the examples.  Finally, only the geospatial interdependencies, 
where nodes are in close physical proximity, are modeled.   
The work in this dissertation is the first vertical step in the 
development of the fully functioning CIMoRE tool.  The development of the 
IP network translations for the three subsectors (highways, 
communications network, and electricity) selected for this project, the 
changes the ISEAGE testbed, and the ability to introduce disruptive 
events lay the foundation for future work to include all 16 of critical 
infrastructure sectors and all five types of interdependencies.   
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CHAPTER 5. TRANSFORMING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
INTO NETWORK REPRESENTATIONS 
Placing the critical infrastructure subsector’s attributes into a 
networking framework meant the most basic aspects of a network need to 
be enumerated.  The most basic elements of a network include  
• the connection from one device to another,  
• the action the device can take such as routing or switching 
traffic,  
• the bandwidth or amount of traffic the connection can 
accommodate,  
• the number of packets dropped or the loss on the network,  
• and the protocols allowed on the network.  
While those elements seem rudimentary, there are a multitude of 
questions associated with trying to think about or talk about a physical 
critical infrastructure subsector in these networking terms.  Questions 
arise such as what is a connection?  What piece of the subsector is 
considered a device?  Is the subsector node (device) a decision point?  
Can the path change at that node or does it simply exist as a point where 
traffic passes through it?  In other words, is it a router or a switch?  
Additional questions would include determining how to convert the traffic 
or capacity of the critical infrastructure to a bandwidth and what is an 
acceptable loss on that capacity? 
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Table 1 shows the data that needed to be collected about each 
critical infrastructure subsector selected for this dissertation. Each critical 
infrastructure subsector is treated as its own network. The protocol that is 
being carried on the network path is identified based upon the subsector 
that is being transformed.  The points along the network segment where 
critical decisions are made will be treated as routers.  Otherwise, if there 
are points that need to be listed but no decisions are made, they will be 
treated as switches.  The total capacity that a specific critical subsector 
path can accommodate, or produce, is considered the bandwidth.  This 
has an average bandwidth, as well as a maximum value.  The maximum 
value represents when the path is operating at full capacity.  Additionally, 
the reduction in capacity or production is transformed into loss on the 
network.  To try to find how each of these pieces of data could be built 
from cooperator files and eventually design the database from which the 
CIMoRE configuration file could be built, it was necessary to see what 
types of data existed and think about how those conversions could be 
made. Therefore, it was necessary to acquire the subsector data in its 
native form or from a willing cooperator to determine what was known and 
recorded on each critical infrastructure subsector.  
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Table 1.  Data needed to build a network for each subsector 
Sector Transportation Information 
Technology 
Energy 
Subsector Highway system Communications 
Network 
Electricity 
Network    
Network Segment    
Latitude/Longitude    
Protocol    
Device Type 
(Router/Switch) 
   
Average 
Bandwidth 
   
Maximum  
Bandwidth 
   
Loss    
 
Acquire the Subsector Data 
In meetings held with the state and national homeland security 
staff, as well as the Iowa Department of Transportation staff and the Iowa 
Communications Network staff, all parties expressed interest in and verbal 
support of the CIMoRE project.  However, after repeatedly requesting data 
for use in the project and repeatedly being told the data would come, the 
data never would arrive.   It became apparent that real data, especially 
data about critical infrastructures in a time when the nation, businesses, 
and public agencies have heightened security concern, was going to be 
difficult to acquire.  This was compounded by the fact that critical 
infrastructure subsector data is held by many private companies and 
some, if not all, data is proprietary.  And, once the data is received from a 
private company, it takes some level of expertise in the area to find the 
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connecting links and the interdependencies.  While government agencies 
and private industry would willingly discuss the CIMoRE project, and 
appeared on the surface eager to help, it became apparent that by asking 
for access to the data and the long lag times that they were hesitant to 
give the full database that contained the pieces of information or put any 
people hours toward pulling the data.   
Therefore, as a proof of concept, I had to find the native database 
and extract the useful fields in the case of the highway subsector.  In the 
case of the Iowa Communications Network (ICN) and the power grid, 
paper maps were either acquired or purchased and representative data 
was created by hand.  This was an unanticipated step of developing 
CIMoRE and took significant time to understand the data points, 
determine the physical layouts, and develop the actual physical drawing 
before any network transformations could be done.  Gaining access may 
continue in the future to be a stumbling block for the development of a fully 
functional CIMoRE tool.  
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Fig.  4. CIMoRE network creation process 
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Fig. 4 shows the process that should have occurred in the creation 
of the ISEAGE configuration files for CIMoRE to operate.  A cooperator 
from a government agency or a private company selects the necessary 
data points from the native database.  The fields to be selected and 
included in the data export will be a joint effort between the CIMoRE 
developer and the subsector specialists.  Their data would be in a variety 
of their own databases and stored in a variety of formats.  These data 
would be output in a flat file format.  A program would then read the data 
in the flat file and create the standard intermediate file that contains the 
uniform attributes.  In addition to standardizing the attributes, the program 
that creates the intermediate file will add fields to record the subsector 
type and source of the data.   
A second program would read the intermediate file and create the 
ISEAGE configuration file which the CIMoRE tool will use.  The second 
program could also perform the calculation on the physical proximity of the 
different subsector nodes to each other to programmatically account for 
geospatial interdependences in the configuration files.  Developing the 
algorithm to determine the level of the physical proximity of the nodes 
needed for a geospatial interdependency to be created is a unique 
research problem of its own.  It will not be formally addressed in this 
dissertation other than to say that the latitude and longitude of the nodes 
will be used to place the nodes onto a map of the state.  A grid will then be 
drawn over the state and any devices falling within the same cell of the 
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grid are considered to have geospatial interdependency.  In this 
dissertation, the geospatial interdependences are created manually rather 
than by using a computer generated analysis.   
While the process above is what I originally strove for, without a 
willing cooperator, the data used in this dissertation was gathered as 
described below.   
Highway Data From IDOT 
The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) has a database 
system called Geographic Information Management System (GIMS) which 
reports statewide and county-by-county data on all roads in the state.  
These database files are shared on a web site and publicly accessible 
[26].  I downloaded and extracted the zipped files for 2010 which was the 
most currently available data at the time of download, as well as the 
metadata files which described each field contained the database.  There 
was a total of 14 zipped files that comprised the complete dataset.  Each 
of the zipped files extracted into four files with the following extensions:  
dbf, shp, prj, shx.   
In reading through the metadata about each of the files, it was 
determined that the files needed to be loaded into a mysql database so 
that the unique identifier for each road segment could be used to join 
tables and review data about road segments.  A separate server running 
FreeBSD, apache, mysql, and php was then setup on an older computer 
to allow for the import of the dbf file into mysql.  While an import program 
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was written in php due to my familiarity and the assumption that would 
speed the import process along, the number of records in the dbf files 
significantly increased the load time.   Each file contained just under 
330,000 rows and a minimum of 50 columns.  All 14 dbf files were loaded 
into mysql.  
In examining the data imported from the 14 dbf files and using the 
metadata information, a sequencing of the road information had to be 
determined.  The roads were sequenced by county in ascending order 
based upon where the road starts in the county and either south to north 
or west to east.  Therefore, to get a complete route of the road, the 
counties also had to be accessed in order as they move south to north or 
west to east across the state.   While I originally determined the ordering 
by logical reasoning, it was confirmed by contacting the IDOT staff and 
receiving a confirmation email of the correct ordering.   
While the ordering of the road segments problem was overcome, 
unfortunately, in the examination of the database fields, it was determined 
that the GIS coordinates for each segment were not contained the in the 
dbf file.  The GIMS program uses the shp file to provide GIS information.  
Therefore, to put the GIS coordinates into the extracted file to simulate 
what would ultimately come from the cooperator in the real world 
application of CIMoRE, I opened the shape file from within ArcGIS and 
then extract the coordinates using the ArcToolbox’s conversion tool and 
saving the layer to a kml file.  This text file was then used to import the xml 
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values for the latitude and longitude for each road segment, as well as its 
unique identifier, into the existing mysql database. 
Once the road data existed in a single mysql database it could be 
examined to determine which fields would allow me to transform the road 
system into a network.  Through reading the metadata information, 
running many queries of the database, and examining the extracted fields 
I began to get an overall view of the road system in Iowa.   This work 
confirmed the initial suspicion that there would not be exact one to one 
mappings of data from the road database to network features needed for 
the ISEAGE configuration file.  Therefore, multiple pieces of information 
would need to be used to construct each of the characteristics listed in 
Table 1.   
Network, Network Segments, and Devices 
Each road is identified by a unique road number.  The data field is 
named state route and this can be used to represent the individual 
networks.  By definition, a network segment is a connection between two 
devices.  In the case of the road system, the roads are already divided into 
segments in the database.  Each of these segments is identified by a field 
call mslink.  However, the segments do not always have an on or off ramp 
or any other logical connector to another road which could be construed 
as a device.  So, not only will the numbered pieces of the road be used, 
but also there has to be an interchange which will represent a router in the 
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network transposition.  In the database, interchanges are marked, but 
there is also a piece of data called the access control which when 
combined with the interchange field means that there is an on and off 
ramp.  This on and off ramp is a decision point for travelers.  The analogy 
can be made that the on and off ramp decision point for a traveler is 
comparable to a router being a decision point for where a packet travels. 
This is shown in Fig. 5.  
Another piece of data that will be used for geospatially locating the 
devices is the latitude and longitude.  Because of the manipulations 
completed to load the data files for the roads into a single mysql database 
each of the interchanges that act as routers can be located on a map of 
the state of Iowa.  Finally, to get the network segments to be connected to 
each other in an ordered fashion, the state route number, the county 
sequence number and the route sequence number is used to build the 
connected network.   
Bandwidth and Loss 
For the road system, there is a report of the average daily traffic 
which is used to approximate average bandwidth.  However, there is not a 
Fig.  5. Road database information used to create network 
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maximum traffic field or data available.  For the sake of proof of concept, a 
25% overage on the average daily traffic was set as the upper limit of 
traffic or the maximum bandwidth in network terms.  When a cooperator 
provides this information in the future, the cooperator’s expertise would be 
used to estimate this upper limit.   
In the case of the road system, there is not a data field reported in 
the IDOT database that can be translated into acceptable loss.  However, 
lane closures and road reconstruction would roughly translate into loss on 
a network.  Therefore, for proof of concept again, a 25% decrease in the 
calculated maximum traffic (or maximum bandwidth) was used to 
represent a single lane closure in one direction on a section of the 
Interstate.  This would then translate to a 25% loss of packets on the 
network.  Obviously, four lanes of closure on the Interstate, which can be 
experienced during an extremely severe vehicle accident, is translated as 
a 100% loss of packets on the network.   
Although the mysql tables were populated in the CIMoRE database 
for all roads in Iowa, for this dissertation, the roads of interest will be the 
Interstates 80 and 35 only.   
ICN Data 
The Iowa Communications Network (ICN) was selected as the 
communications subsector to be used in this dissertation.  It is a state-
owned agency that was created by legislation in the Iowa statehouse in 
1989. By 1994 it had 104 endpoints.  The ICN today has an estimated 
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8661 miles of fiber – 3400 miles owned by the state and 5261 miles 
leased.  The ICN provides video, data, and voice for 1500 authorized 
users throughout the State of Iowa, including K-12 schools, higher 
education, hospitals,  state and federal government, National Guard 
armories, and libraries [27, 28].  In this dissertation, I’m not looking at the 
video conferencing aspect of the ICN, but the ICN acting as an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP).   
As with the IDOT data, I was unable to find a cooperator within the 
ICN organization to provide the data about its the physical layout and 
characteristics, so the data had to be approximated.  Unfortunately, there 
was not an electronic format enumerating where the fiber runs in the state, 
what cities are connected, or the types of connections.  There are multiple 
static maps available on various web sites, however, these did not give 
any detailed information such as the actual path the fiber took or the towns 
it passed through.  A listing of the rooms where a person or organization 
can book an ICN room was the most specific electronic information 
available.  However, I was fortunate that a copy of two paper maps from 
2003 were in a faculty member’s possession. While these are old, and 
probably outdated, they contained enough physical and logical information 
on them, that the proof of concept database could be constructed.  From 
this constructed database a flat file was generated.  Again, this step is to 
approximate what a cooperator would be providing to the CIMoRE project 
in the future.  Fortunately, after working with the IDOT road data, I had 
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some ideas of the types of data fields that would be needed to create 
using these two maps.    
The first map provided rough information about the network 
topology.  It identified the five fiber loops that comprise the ICN for the 
state.  It also showed the two levels of end nodes and the specific towns in 
which they were located.  The first group of end nodes that were 
implemented in the building of the ICN were at the 15 community college 
districts in Iowa and they were identified on the map by the community 
college number.  Additionally, the three regents universities were identified 
at this first tier.  The second tier of end nodes were implemented at later 
date and were identified by town name only.  Additionally, the number of 
fiber pairs were identified on the map, as well as the distance from fiber 
connection to fiber connection.  Since the largest number of fiber pairs 
were at Camp Dodge (Johnston), IA, it was assumed that this was the 
center of the network and that all five of the network loops in the state 
would terminate back at this location.   
However, the first map did not provide any information about the 
devices connecting the end nodes through the fiber, nor the geographic 
path these fiber pairs took.  The second map provided approximate 
geographical information about the location of the fiber, primarily by 
identifying the cities through which the fiber passed on a map of the state 
of Iowa.  Additionally, the cities in which switches and repeaters were 
located were shown on the map.   
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Using these two maps, the data that a cooperator to the CIMoRE 
project would provide was approximated.  It was stored it in an Excel 
spreadsheet which was uploaded into the CIMoRE mysql database.  
Because the original concept of the ICN was to connect all of the county 
seats with fiber and then create a star network off that central county 
location to the high school, the two maps were used to create the data 
points for the five network loops.   Each of the network loops was 
numbered.  Then, working between the two maps, the city names were 
used to identify the connections of each network loop. Fig. 6 shows how 
the networks were constructed. 
After the manual creation of the network, the latitude and longitude 
coordinates of the towns still need to be identified.  By saving the Excel file 
to a comma separated table Google Refine could be used to retrieve the 
latitude and longitude of each city [29] in a programmatic way.  This file 
was then uploaded into the CIMoRE mysql database to approximate what 
would be received from the cooperator.   
Because the data was specifically constructed for this project and 
because this is already a communications network, less conversion work 
had to be done than with the highway information.  
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Network, Network Segments, and Devices 
In the case of the ICN, I was already working with a network 
topology so there isn’t a conversion process that is needed.  It was more a 
process of trying to understand how the ICN is constructed which did not 
prove easy as no databases or cooperators were found.  The fiber 
between the towns represented a network segment.  Each town has a 
device in it and those are treated as routers.   And, while the ICN can 
carry synchronous video, as well as data, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the only traffic considered was data traffic.    
Bandwidth and Loss 
There is no indication on the maps what bandwidth is currently 
available on the fiber loops that connect the state. The assumption was 
made that it is single mode fiber and running at 40 Gbps.  However, that is 
undocumented at this time.  In a real set of data from a cooperator this 
value would be provided. So, for proof of concept purposes 40 Gbps is 
used as the maximum bandwidth.  The assumption was made that 75% of 
that bandwidth is used on an average day or 30 Gbps rate.   
Fig.  6. ICN information used to create network 
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Electricity Transmission Lines 
Again, there was no electronic data to be had, so a paper map was 
purchased from the Iowa Utilities Board for $12 and a layout was created 
in an Excel spreadsheet using the data from the paper map.  Again, 
because a comma separated file was created, Google Refine was used to 
add the latitudes and longitudes.  The process mirrored the process 
undertaken for the ICN network.  The Excel spreadsheet was loaded into 
the CIMoRE mysql database to approximate what would be received from 
the cooperator.   
Network, Network Segments, and Devices 
The transmission line type in kV and the line number was used to 
identify the network.  Each city that the line passed through was recorded 
as a router and the segments were numbered from the generating station 
out to the final distribution point.  If a generating station or a transmission 
station was in the city it was noted and stored in the mysql database.  
However, generating stations and transmission stations are not used in 
this dissertation.  The data was just included for future use.  Fig. 7 shows 
the creation of the electricity subsector network. 
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Bandwidth and Loss 
Unlike the other two subsectors, electricity will not have a 
percentage loss in CIMoRE.  It is either 100% loss meaning the power is 
out or 0% loss which means the lines are functioning normally.   
 
  
Fig.  7. Electricity line information used to create network 
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CHAPTER 6.  ISEAGE MODIFICATIONS AND CONFIGURATION 
CHANGES 
 The Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment 
(ISEAGE) was developed as a cyber security research testbed by the 
Information Assurance Center (IAC) at Iowa State University under 
funding from the Department of Justice (DoJ).  It provides a routable 
Internet that has an air gap proxy server through which only three 
protocols are allowed: http, https, and ftp.  This provides a safe 
environment for networking, cyber security experimentation, and 
penetration testing while preventing that traffic from entering the 
production network.   
How ISEAGE Works 
The core of the ISEAGE testbed is a routable IP network which 
supports traffic to and from the virtual networks it hosts.  It provides IP 
address space for each virtual network and allows the running of a 
network as if it were actually sitting on the Internet.  The networks use 
public IP addresses that are “borrowed” from ranges used in the Internet, 
but, because of the air gap proxy, none of these public IP addresses ever 
escape into real Internet traffic.  Because of ISEAGE’s internal 
programming called ISEFLOW, ISEAGE allows traffic to appear as if it is 
routed through the Internet, although all traffic is contained within the 
ISEAGE environment. 
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ISEAGE is unlike conventional testbeds where each router is 
represented by either a real router or a software router running on a 
computer.  ISEFLOW, the internal programming, supports the concept of 
an internal cloud network where the cloud represents a cluster of routers. 
If one of the computers performs a traceroute to another network, it would 
see a number of hops between itself and the other network as if there 
were real routers between it and the other network.  The TTL field in the IP 
header would also indicate the traffic traversed multiple routers.  Again, 
this allows traffic to look as if it was traveling from a local network through 
the Internet to another destination local network.  However, the traffic is 
contained in the testbed server.  
ISEAGE can be deployed in a single server or over multiple pieces 
of hardware.  When it is installed over a number of servers it has been 
named an ISERink.  ISERinks have been used extensively in the 
classroom environment (Iowa State’s CprE 230, 231, 431, 530 and 532, 
Oklahoma State’s 4523 and 4233), in cyber defense competitions for high 
schools, 2-year and 4-year institutions, and in cyber security training for 
National Guard units in Iowa, Alaska, and Minnesota [30, 31].  The use of 
an ISERink has been casually called creating a “playground” where 
individuals can build, work, and test systems.   
The following description and image in Fig. 8 is described in the 
terms of students working in a classroom environment.  However, the 
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setup is the same whether the users are students, guardsmen, or 
professionals using the ISERink.   
Currently, VMware ESXi servers are used to implement the 
ISERink.  As the brown line in Fig. 8 depicts, students enter the 
management network from their residence hall or apartment via the 
vCenter server.  The vCenter allows them access to the three ESXi 
servers where they can build and configure their networks or run 
penetration testing.  In Fig. 8 the student servers are labeled Blue 1, Blue 
2, and Blue 3.  The servers that students build and configure can only 
communicate through the ISEAGE network.  There are currently 45 public 
IP ranges that have been “borrowed” from the Internet with 15 assigned to 
each of three internal boards.  These boards will be described in more 
details, but for now they are represented in Fig. 8 as the blue ISEAGE 
logo.  For example, Board 1 is connected to Blue 1 server and the 
students assigned to that server build their networks or test their 
equipment using those IP ranges.     
Traffic generated by these machines, noted by the blue connecting 
lines in Fig. 8, is routed internally by ISEFLOW.  If the traffic is intended 
for an IP in the ISEAGE network and it is on the same board, ISEFLOW 
moves the traffic through its internal routers on that board to allow the 
traffic to look like it moves through multiple hops before returning back to 
an end node network.  The end node routers are called an outside 
network in ISEFLOW terms. If the traffic is intended for one of the other 
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IPs in ISEAGE, ISEFLOW routes through the Backplane to the 
corresponding board again using its internal routers to demonstrate 
multiple hops.  If the traffic is sent to an IP that is outside of the ISEAGE 
environment (noted by a gray line in Fig. 8), ISEFLOW sends the traffic 
through its internal routers to Keyhole 1.  If it is http, https, or ftp traffic, 
then Keyhole1 performs a network address translation on the request and 
sends it out through Keyhole 2 to the Internet.  Traffic using other 
protocols is dropped.     
In a smaller deployment or for development work, ISEAGE and the 
systems being built for testing are housed in the same ESXi server. 
However, the testbed functions in the same manner as was described 
above.  It was the smaller, single server environment that was used for 
CIMoRE development.   
Allowing for Different Types of Traffic in ISEAGE 
Normally ISEAGE is configured with two or three hops between the 
backplane that connects multiple edge routers.  Fig. 9 below shows the 
internal setup of ISEAGE which is depicted as the ISEAGE logo in Fig. 8 
above.  It is this routing that makes traffic look like it takes multiple hops in 
the ISEAGE network.   
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Fig.  8. Typical ISERink setup 
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Fig.  9. Typical ISEAGE internal networking 
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The ISEFLOW software performs the routing functions in ISEAGE 
by reading configuration files to build the routers and route tables at 
startup time.  ISEFLOW then handles the network traffic as it moves from 
end node router to end node router inside the ISEAGE testbed.  While 
ISEAGE works very well for routing TCP/IP traffic, several modifications 
need to be made in ISEFLOW to allow network traffic to model critical 
infrastructure subsector networks.   
While all traffic moving in the CIMoRE model is TCP/IP traffic, there 
needed to be a way to differentiate which subsector the traffic represents 
and how to treat it. ISEFLOW does not differentiate between types of 
traffic at the IP layer.  ISEFLOW was programmed to recognize the old 
Type of Service (ToS) field in IPv4.  The ToS field was created to provide 
preferences to different packets depending upon the setting in the field.  
Historically this field was not used and all 8 bits were set to 0.  However, 
as services such as Voice of IP (VoIP) which require a minimum bit rate 
and maximum latency to operate have evolved and become 
commonplace, the prioritization of certain types of packets has increased 
in importance.  In 1998, the ToS field was changed to be the Differentiated 
Services field (DS field) by definition in RFC 2474 [32] and implemented in 
RFC 2475 [33].  It has since been updated in 2002 by RFC 3260 [34].  
The use of the DS field allows a network administrator to define different 
classes of traffic such that each class can be treated differently.  Each 
class is given a relative priority based upon the total bandwidth of the 
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connection.  This effectively achieves different levels of Quality of Service 
(QoS) for each class of traffic.   
Although traffic in a Differentiated Services (DiffServ) domain (a 
network that is using Differentiated Services) can be classified by fields 
other than, or in addition to, the DS field (for example, source address or 
destination address), the common practice is to have routers make traffic 
classifications based upon information contained in the DS field and then 
assign some relative priority of access to network resources on the egress 
of the router.   
According to the standard the DS field contains two pieces of 
information; a 6-bit Differentiated Service Code Point (DSCP) and an 
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) code in the least significant 2 bits 
(See Fig. 10).  This means there can be 64 different traffic classes defined 
with DSCP values each with its own differential forwarding treatment.  The 
forwarding treatments of the packets are called Per Hop Behaviors (PHB).  
The value of the DSCP can be thought of as an index to the PHB action 
table.  Each router can do different per hop behaviors based upon its 
mapping table.  That means each router can do conditioning (add a 
DSCP) or can change the DSCP to PHB mapping.  
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Fig.  10.  IPv4 packet layout  
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While the DS field was designed to be used for QoS purposes, the 
standard allows for locally customizable mappings of DSCPs and PHBs.  
There is no requirement to use standard mappings in a local network.  
Therefore, I have usurped the DS field to mark traffic for different types of 
critical infrastructure subsectors (See Table 2).  Each router’s route table 
which is configured through ISEFLOW would be set in the configuration 
file with the specific DSCP(s) allowed on the connection.  If all traffic is 
allowed on the connection, all ones are set (63) in the router’s 
configuration.  This check would occur on egress of the interface because 
there could be multiple DSCPs entering a router, but potentially only one 
DSCP allowed to exit on each interface.   
Table 2. DS Code Point to PHB Mapping 
DSCP Value 
Binary 
DSCP Value 
Hex 
DSCP Value 
Decimal 
PHB 
111111 0x3F 63 All traffic allowed 
000001 0x01 1 Road traffic 
000010 0x02 2 ICN traffic 
000011 0x03 3 electricity traffic 
 
Additionally, the ECN 2-bit values can be used to identify a router 
that is in a healthy state, failing state, failed state, or recovering state (See 
Table 3).  The routers could start in any of the four states which will 
discussed in Chapter 7.     
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Table 3. ECN Value and Interpretation 
ECN Value 
Binary 
ECN Interpretation 
00 Failed – No traffic allowed 
01 Failing – Going down 
10 Recovering – Returning back to normal 
11 Healthy – Full use of bandwidth 
 
All routers must be able to interpret DSCPs and apply PHBs.  
Therefore, any traffic introduced into ISEAGE will need to have the DS 
field coded.  Additionally, any physical routers or physical equipment such 
as SCADA devices that are connected into the ISEAGE environment will 
need to either have the same DSCPs to PHB mappings or have their 
traffic run through a conditioner that inserts the DS field information.    
Defining New Types of Routers in ISEFLOW 
A network diagram of the internal network required to model three 
critical infrastructure subsectors is shown in Fig. 11.  This network 
includes highway traffic, ICN traffic, and electricity traffic.  It was drawn 
using both the old and the new router types defined in ISEFLOW for 
CIMoRE.  The overall picture is shown here to give the reader perspective 
before the new types of routers are discussed.  The four types of routers 
used in ISEFLOW will be described below.   
The connections to Boards 4 and 5 were omitted in Fig. 11 to save 
space.  However, Boards 4 and 5 will still be used in CIMoRE the same 
way they are used in a traditional ISEAGE implementation shown in Fig. 9.  
Fig. 11 also depicts significantly fewer routers than what the full dataset 
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would require (and what I recorded in the mysql database).  They were 
reduced so that the picture was understandable.   
Normal Router 
The first type of router to be discussed is a router that acts like a 
physical Cisco router.  It has multiple ingress and egress interfaces and 
follows normal routing protocols.  This router type already exists in 
ISEFLOW and is just called a router.  For the purposes of this dissertation 
it will be labeled a normal router.  As shown in Fig. 11 a majority of the 
routers in a CIMoRE configuration would be normal routers.  They are the 
routers that pass a single type of critical infrastructure traffic and represent 
one location in the topology.  In Fig. 11 they are gray for the roads, light 
blue for the electric grid, and green for the ICN.   
Fig. 12 shows the detail of two normal routers on Board 1 labeled 
R3 and R2.  These represent the interchanges on I-35 for Clear Lake (R3) 
and Northwood (R2) which would be normal routers.  The traffic would 
represent the vehicular traffic moving between the two interchanges on 
the interstate highway.  Clear Lake would have two interfaces; one that 
connects to Northwood and the other connecting to Ames which is not 
pictured.  Northwood only has one interface and that is connected to Clear 
Lake.  Eventually, the Northwood router could have a second interface 
that would be connected to an interchange in Minnesota or a system for  
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Fig.  11.  Network diagram of three critical infrastructure subsectors 
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modeling Minnesota’s roads, but that is outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  Both routers would only allow traffic with a DSCP value of 1.   
 
Fig.  12. Normal routers used in the highway subsector 
Edge Node Router  
The second type of router that already exists in ISEFLOW is the 
outside router.  These routers have an interface that is assigned multiple 
IP address ranges which allows multiple networks to be connected at 
these points.  In a deployment of an ISERink for a classroom, CDC, or 
training it is this type of router that allows the 15 IP address ranges for the 
student networks to be connected to one board.  While this router is called 
an outside router in ISEFLOW, that causes confusion for someone not 
familiar with the inner workings of ISEAGE.  The naïve assumption is that 
it is “outside” of ISEAGE.  Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation 
the name of this type of router is changed to edge node router to more 
clearly define its function.    
Fig. 13 shows the use of an edge node router in critical 
infrastructure subsector modeling.  In this case, instead of providing an IP 
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for students to build their network, the IP range would be allowed so that 
physical equipment such as a supervisory and control data acquisition 
(SCADA) system could connected into the CIMoRE.  The figure shows a 
server depicting a SCADA system that would be passing traffic about the 
electric grid connected to an end node router.  The DSCP value would be 
3 on this edge node router.   
 
Fig.  13.  Edge node router used in electricity network 
Instead of connecting physical equipment into CIMoRE as shown in 
Fig. 13, an edge node router could be used to connect another software 
program that models critical infrastructure subsectors.  If the subsector 
modeled in software has an output or input interdependency with critical 
infrastructure subsectors being modeling in CIMoRE, the edge node router 
would allow that information to be fed into the testbed.   
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Additionally, an edge node router could be used to connect 
CIMoRE into another network testbed that is modeling multiple critical 
infrastructure subsectors.  The second testbed could provide 
interdependency data for the critical infrastructure subsectors being 
modeling inside of CIMoRE through this type of router.    
A cautionary tale to using an edge node router to connect to 
physical equipment, critical infrastructure subsector modeling software, or 
another testbed is that any physical connections into CIMoRE would need 
to be conditioned; adding the DSCP to match our network under test. Of 
course, ISEFLOW would also have to be configured to know about the 
external systems.   
Connector Node Router 
In addition to the currently existing normal and edge node routers, 
two new types of routers have been added to ISEFLOW.  The first is a 
connector node router.  The normal router definition in ISEFLOW allows 
for multiple ingress and egress ports, but it does not allow for multiple 
connections to the backplane to allow traffic to cross from one board to 
another.  As ISEFLOW currently works any traffic that needs to cross from 
one board to another must pass through a single normal router connected 
to the backplane.  This router is included in the path and hop count the 
packet takes.  In the case of modeling critical infrastructure subsectors 
there needs to be a way for multiple paths through the backplane without 
requiring the hop be included in the total count.   
56 
 
 
A connector node router allows different types of critical 
infrastructure traffic to move from board to board without being counted in 
the number of hops from source to destination.  In this example it will 
move from Board 2 to Board 3.  Due to how ISEFLOW is written, a 
connector node router must be configured as a router, but it functions as a 
switch.  Fig. 14 shows connector node router C2 which is connected to 
Board 2.  It allows connectivity to the back plane for both the Ankeny 
router labeled J2 (a junction node router discussed below) and R3 a 
normal router depicting Des Moines interstate vehicle traffic. In this figure, 
the DSCP value to J2 is 63 which allows all types of traffic.  On the 
connection to R3, only the DSCP value of 1 (highway traffic) is allowed.    
 
Fig.  14.  Connector node router used in the highway network 
The Des Moines router labeled R3 on Board 2 represents 
interchange 137 where I-80 and I-35 merge.  The traffic coming from the 
north arrives through the Ankeny interchange (greatly simplified from the 
multiple Ankeny interchanges so that a picture could be drawn).  The road 
traffic coming from the west comes through Johnston interchange and 
then on to this location.  So, while the router at 137 will have interfaces for 
I-80 and I-35, the road traffic cannot come through a single router.  The 
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traffic from the north will come through Ankeny and will be directly 
attached as shown in Fig.14 because it is configured on the same board 
as Ankeny which is Board 2.  However, Johnston is configured on Board 3 
and the connection to it must be made through the connector node router.  
Again, the connector node routers will not be part of the hop count.  They 
are only used to provide connectivity through the Backplane.       
Junction Node Router 
The second new type of router defined in ISEFLOW is a junction 
node router.  The junction node router allows an interdependency to be 
identified.   In this dissertation only geospatial interdependencies are 
included, but the new junction node router definition allows multiple types 
of interdependencies to be included in CIMoRE.  A junction node router 
attaches to a connector node router and has at least two different types of 
critical infrastructure subsector traffic on it.  In this dissertation it depicts a 
physical location where two critical infrastructures reside in near proximity.  
In Fig. 15 Ames, J1, is a junction node.  It has all three critical 
infrastructures located in near to each other.  So, this junction node router 
will be able to receive all three DSCP values (63) on the interface 
connected to connector C1.  It only allows electricity traffic (DSCP value of 
3) on two interfaces to router R1 and R10.  Only road traffic (DSCP value 
of 1) is allowed on the interface connected to R3.  And only ICN traffic 
(DSCP value of 2) is allowed on the connection to R28.   
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The junction nodes are created by using the latitude and longitude 
of the critical infrastructure subsector component to mark their locations 
on a map of Iowa.  The map of Iowa then has a grid superimposed over 
top of it.  Any critical infrastructure components that lie in the same grid 
cell are determined to be geospatially interdependent and are represented 
in CIMoRE as a junction node.   
Writing a CIMoRE Configuration File for ISEFLOW Version 1.1 
Returning to the larger image, I added IP ranges and interface IPs 
to produce Fig. 16.  This allowed me to write a full ISEFLOW configuration 
file to be used in CIMoRE.  However, the full configuration file is more than 
25 pages long, so it was not included in this dissertation or in an appendix.  
It is available upon request.  As a sample of what a configuration file looks 
like, example code will be provided with figures to depict each type of 
router configured in CIMoRE.  
Fig.  15.  Junction node router used to represent geospatial interdependency 
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Fig.  16.  Network diagram with IP addresses assigned
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Backplane Definition  
The top of the configuration file for ISEFLOW constructs the 
Backplane which allows traffic to be passed from board to board.  The 
global definitions for the Backplane for CIMoRE remain the same as for 
use in a normal ISEAGE configuration.  As shown in Fig. 17 there are still 
five boards in the first backplane.  Boards 1-3 are used in CIMoRE as they 
are used in any ISEAGE testbed setup; for machines or equipment that 
are under test.  Board 4 connects the air gap proxy called Keyhole and 
Board 5 is the Tap board which allows for capturing all traffic that occurs in 
the testbed.  There is also a second backplane created that is part of the 
packet captures that enables the two Keyhole servers to communicate 
with each other.   
Globals=   { 
 BPnet=0,130.175.1.0,24 
  board=1,2,1,130.175.1.1 
  board=2,2,1,130.175.1.2 
  board=3,1,1,130.175.1.3 
  board=4,0,1,130.175.1.4 
  board=5,0,1,130.175.1.5 
 Parms = { 
  name=Primary Backplane 
  #board=board, router, interface, IP 
 /parms 
 BPnet=1,10.10.10.0,24 
 Parms = { 
  name=KeyHole Backplane 
 /parms 
 
Fig.  17.  Backplane definitions in the ISEFLOW configuration file 
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Global Link Definitions 
The next section of the ISEFLOW configuration file defines the 
different types of links that can be used in CIMoRE.  These global links 
allow the initial states for each of the critical infrastructure subsectors to be 
declared as well.  In this case, each is defined as healthy and functioning 
with no loss.  As shown in Fig. 18 there were three global links defined in 
this configuration file.  One was created for each critical infrastructure 
subsector used.   
Each of the global links contains information about three 
characteristics of that critical infrastructure subsector.  The three 
characteristics used in this dissertation are maximum bandwidth, average 
bandwidth, and percentage of loss.  These are values that are received 
from the cooperator when CIMoRE is in a fully functional state.  For this 
proof of concept, these are the values I created and loaded into the mysql 
CIMoRE database.  The number of parameters can be expanded in the 
global link definition if additional values are needed to describe a different 
critical infrastructure subsector or if CIMoRE needs to have additional 
features added to it in the future. 
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Board Definitions 
The next section of the ISEFLOW configuration file defines each of 
the boards.  While all three boards were fully defined based upon Fig. 16 
in the 25-page configuration file, this configuration discussion will use 
Fig.  18.  Global links to define defaults for each subsector 
#These parameters are all the initial states for healthy infrastructures 
 
GLINK=1,CIMORE 
 Parms = { 
  name=interstate 
  #default maximum capacity of the road 
  #can be changed information coming from database 
  #number is in thousands 
  maxbandwidth=10  
  avebandwidth=5 
  #reduction in lanes in percentage 
  #50 means only half of average traffic volume  
      loss=0 
   
GLINK=2,CIMORE 
 Parms = { 
  name=icn 
  #default maximum bandwidth of the link 
  #can be changed information coming from database 
  #number is in gbps 
  maxbandwidth=10  
  avebandwidth=1  
  #reduction in bandwidth in percentage 
  #50 means bandwidth has been reduced by 50% 
      loss=0 
   
GLINK=3,CIMORE 
 Parms = { 
  name=electric 
  #type of transmission line 
  #can be changed information coming from database 
  #number is in kV 
  maxbandwidth=161  
  avebandwidth=161 
  #reduction in bandwidth in is on or off 
  #if 1, then the line is off.  If 0, then line functioning normal 
      loss=0 
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Board 1 because each of the types of routers used to configure CIMoRE 
are found on this board.   
Connections Section 
At the beginning of each board definition is the section about 
connecting the “physical” wiring for each router found on the board.  
These can be thought of as plugging the ethernet cables or fiber jumpers 
into the different routers to make the physical paths.  In Fig. 19 the 
connections for all four types of routers are included.  
The connections section starts with the edge node router.  It is the 
simplest of the connections to make.  The entry says that R1 on interface 
0 is an outside router (O) which is ISEAGE speak for an edge node router.  
This special kind of router allows CIMoRE to connect physical equipment 
such as SCADA equipment or other modeling software and hardware into 
the testbed as described previously.   
The next connection is a connector node router whose designation 
is a CT.  The two letter abbreviation of CT is used rather than the single 
letter C because C is already used in ISEFLOW for the declaration of a 
cloud which represents Internet traffic for which there is no need to keep 
track of hops.  The connector node router allows all traffic by using the 
global links of 1 for roads, 2 for the ICN, and 3 for electric.  This means 
that all packets representing those critical infrastructure subsectors’ traffic 
will be allowed on the “wire.”  Reading the line it says that connector node 
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1 (CT1) is wired to Backplane 0 on interface 1 and allows packets 
representing interstate traffic (DSCP value of 1), ICN traffic (DSCP value 
of 2) and electricity traffic (DSCP value of 3).   
As discussed previously, the junction node router allows modeling 
of interdependencies and specifically in this dissertation the geospatial co-
location of critical infrastructure subsectors.  The designation is J for a 
junction node and in this case there are five interfaces that need to be 
defined.  The first line of the junction node definition states that junction 
node router 1 on interface 0 (J1,0) is connected to connector node router 
CT1 on interface 0 and allows all three types of critical infrastructure 
packets to traverse the connection.   
The second line of the junction node definition shows that J1 on 
interface 1 is directly connected to an edge router R1 on interface 1. This 
connection is configured as a global link that only allows electricity traffic 
and has the characteristics defined in the global link of being a 161 kV line 
that is operating in a healthy state.  In other words, the power is on for that 
connection.  The rest of the J1 interfaces are similarly configured in that 
they are specific to a type of critical infrastructure traffic and its 
characteristics based upon the global link attached.   
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board=1 
connections={ 
 
#edge node router 
#RRouter_num,Int => O 
R1,0 => O 
 
#connector node router 
#all traffic types allowed 
#RRouter_num,Int => backplane_num,Int,link_type(GLINK),[link_num] 
CT1,1 => B0,1,1,2,3  
 
#junction node router 
#connects to one of four types 
#edge node => R, normal router =>R, connector router => CT, junction node router => J 
#RRouter_num,Int => 
edge_normal_connector_junction_num,Int,link_type(GLINK),[link_num] 
J1,0 => CT1,0,1,2,3 
J1,1 => R1,1,3 
J1,2 => R3,1,1 
J1,3 => R10,1,3 
J1,4 => R28,1,2 
#normal router 
#RRouter_num,Int => router_num,Int,link_type(GLINK),[link_num] 
R3,0  => R2,1,1 
R10,0 => R9,1,3 
R9,0  => R8,1,3 
R8,0  => R7,1,3 
R7,0  => R6,1,3 
R6,0  => R5,1,3 
R5,0  => R4,1,3 
R28,0 => R27,1,2 
R27,0 => R26,1,2 
R26,0 => R25,1,2 
R25,0 => R24,1,2 
R24,0 => R23,1,2 
R23,0 => R22,1,2 
R22,0 => R21,1,2 
R21,0 => R20,1,2 
R20,0 => R19,1,2 
R19,0 => R18,1,2 
R18,0 => R17,1,2 
R17,0 => R16,1,2 
R16,0 => R15,1,2 
R15,0 => R14,1,2 
R14,0 => R13,1,2 
R13,0 => R12,1,2 
R12,0 => R11,1,2 
Fig.  19.  Connections for Board 1 
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The fourth router that is defined in the connections is the normal 
router.  Many of the routers used in Fig. 16 were normal routers.  The first 
line says R3 on interface 0 is directly connected to R2 on interface 1 and it 
has the characteristics of road traffic that is defined in global link 1.  All 
entries for normal routers look similar with the exception of the type of 
global link applied.       
Router Section 
Each router on each board has its own definition that needs to be 
included in the configuration informatino.  Fig. 20 is provides a network 
diagram to help illustrate each of the types of routers and their routing 
definitions discussed in this section.  The first configuration entry in Fig. 21 
is for connector node router 1 on board 1 (CT1).  CT1 has two interfaces.  
Interface 1 is in the range of IPs for Backplane 0 which is 130.175.1.0/24.  
It is host .1 which represents Board 1.  The DSCP value is also included.  
As discussed previously, 6 bits set in the DS field (DSCP value of 63) 
allows traffic representing all critical infrastructure subsectors in the model 
to be passed.   
Interface 0 of CT1 is in the 131.10.1.0/24 network.  The 131 
represents one hop away from the Backplane and .10 means Board 1.  
Although not shown in Fig. 19, CT2 would have an interface 0 in the range 
of 131.20.1.0/24 which would represent one hop away from the Backplane 
(131) and on Board 2 (.20).   
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After the interfaces, the route tables for the connector node router 
need to be defined.  For CT1, the route to the edge node router IP range 
(64.39.3.0/24), as well as routes to all normal routers must be added.  In 
this case, the route going to those routers is to interface 0 on J1 
(131.10.1.100).  Additionally, the type of subsector traffic allowed on the 
route must be specified.  For example, the route to the edge node router 
(R1) and the route to normal router (R10) only allow electricity traffic 
(DSCP value of 3).   
There are two other routes that need to be defined for a node 
connected to the Backplane, in this case, CT1.  There needs to be a path 
that connects to the air gap proxy Keyhole which is at 199.100.16.100.  
That traffic must exit to the Backplane and then go to Board 4 
(130.17.1.4).  Again, traffic representing all critical infrastructure 
subsectors in the model is allowed (DSCP value of 63).  This would be for 
traffic (http, https, and ftp) that is requested to leave the network from 
Board 1.  
And finally, the default route for traffic that is destined to move to 
another board inside the CIMoRE testbed is routed to Board 5 
(130.175.1.5).  Again, all traffic is allowed on this route which represented 
by the DSCP value of 63.  Having the default route to Board 5 allows the 
capture of all traffic to any device that is connected to Board 5 and 
listening in promiscuous mode.  Board 5 then routes the traffic back to the 
correct board on which the destination IP address is connected.    
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Fig.  20.  Detail of network diagram with IP addresses for routes 
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#one connector node router 
device=connector,1 
#int,IP,mask,dsfield 
if=0,131.10.1.254,24,63  
if=1,130.175.1.1,24,63 
#dest_ip,mask,next_ip,next_interface,dsfield 
r_table=64.39.3.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.1.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.2.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,1 
r_table=132.10.3.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,1 
r_table=132.10.4.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.5.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.6.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.7.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.8.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.9.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.10.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,3 
r_table=132.10.11.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.12.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.13.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.14.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.15.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.16.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.17.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.18.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.19.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.20.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.21.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.22.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.23.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.24.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.25.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.26.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.27.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.28.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
r_table=132.10.29.0,24,131.10.1.100,0,2 
#proxy board 4 
r_table=199.100.16.100,24,130.175.1.4,1,63 
#default router board 5 
r_table=0.0.0.0,24,130.175.1.5,1,63 
Parms = { 
name=b1ct1 
Fig.  21.  Connector node router CT1 definition 
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The routing table for an edge node router (R1) is unique as shown 
in Fig. 22.  The edge node router can have multiple IP ranges connected 
to its “outside” interface.  That interface is defined with if_out instead of the 
normal if.  In the case of R1 there is only one IP range in Fig. 20 where 
SCADA equipment or other software or hardware modeling can be 
connected (64.39.3.0/24).  The IP address given in the definition section is 
.254 which means R1 is the default route for all equipment physically 
added into CIMoRE so its traffic can move into the testbed.  Notice also 
there is a media access control (MAC) address defined on this line.  For 
each outside interface on an edge node router there needs to be a MAC 
address defined.  This is generally done in some sequential manner if 
more than one IP range is added (multiple if_out s are defined.)   Interface 
1 on R1 connects to junction node router 1 (J1) and uses its interface 1 as 
the default route.  Again, only electricity traffic is allowed on this interface 
(DSCP value of 3). 
 
device=router,1 
if_out=0,64.39.3.254,24,00:00:0c:31:01:aa,3 
if=1,132.10.1.100,24,3 
# Dest IP, mask, next IP, interface, dsfield 
r_table=64.39.3.0,24,64.39.3.254,0,3 
#default route J1 
r_table=0.0.0.0,24,132.10.1.254,1,3 
Parms = { 
#abbreviation for outside router 1 
name=b1or1  
Fig.  22.  Edge node router R1 definition 
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The junction node router J1 on Board 1 has five interfaces defined. 
Interface 0 connects back to the connector node router CT1 and has the 
IP of 131.10.1.100.  It allows all types of traffic representing the critical 
infrastructure subsectors being modeled in CIMoRE (DSCP value of 63).  
Interfaces 1-4 allow only traffic from single critical infrastructure subsector 
to enter and leave the router on those interfaces.   
The route tables for this junction node router are large.  All routes 
going toward other routers under test in the testbed must have a route to 
them created.  For example, all road traffic destined for the network 
132.10.2.0/24 which connects R2 and R3 routes to 131.10.3.100 which is 
on R3 interface 1.  Only road traffic (DSCP value of 1) is allowed on this 
route. 
All electricity traffic (DSCP value of 3) for the 132.10.4.0/24 network 
which connects R4 and R5 routes to 132.10.10.100 which is R10 on 
interface 1.  All other routes in the table are similarly configured.   
The default route for all traffic not destined for an IP address on 
Board 1 is through the connector node router CT1 (131.10.1.254) which 
again allows all traffic on it.   
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device=junction,1 
#int,IP,mask,dsfield 
if=0,131.10.1.100,24,63 #ALL 
if=1,132.10.1.254,24,3 
if=2,132.10.3.254,24,1 
if=3,132.10.10.254,24,3 
if=4,132.10.28.254,24,2 
#dest_ip,mask,next_ip,next_interface,dsfield 
r_table=64.39.3.0,24,132.10.1.100,1,3 
#directly connected 132.10.1.0 
r_table=132.10.2.0,24,131.10.3.100,1,1 
#directly connected 132.10.3.0 
r_table=132.10.4.0,24,131.10.10.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.5.0,24,131.10.10.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.6.0,24,131.10.10.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.7.0,24,131.10.10.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.8.0,24,131.10.10.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.9.0,24,131.10.10.100,1,3 
#directly connected 132.10.10.0 
r_table=132.10.11.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.12.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.13.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.14.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.15.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.16.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.17.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.18.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.19.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.20.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.21.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.22.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.23.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.24.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.25.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.26.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
r_table=132.10.27.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
#directly connected 132.10.28.0 
r_table=132.10.29.0,24,131.10.28.100,1,2 
#default router CT1 
r_table=0.0.0.0,24,131.10.1.254,0,63 
Parms = { 
name=b1j1 
Fig.  23.  Junction node router J1 definition 
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Fig. 24 defines a normal router, in this case R3, that has two 
interfaces.  The first interface connects R3 to R2 and the second interface 
connects back to the junction node J1.  There is no need for additional 
routes to be defined here because R3 is connected to the same network 
as R2 and there are no networks beyond R2 to which packets would be 
sent.  Fig. 25 defines R10 which is a normal router with two interfaces on 
it.  However, unlike R3, there are multiple networks it needs to access that 
are beyond R9 which is directly connected to it.  Therefore, there are 
multiple routes to those networks as shown in the figure.     
device=router,3 
#int,IP,mask,dsfield 
if=0,132.10.2.254,24,1 
if=1,132.10.3.100,24,1 
#no additional routes 
#no proxy board here 
#default route J1 
r_table=0.0.0.0,24,132.10.3.254,2,1 
Parms = { 
name=b1r3 
Fig.  24.  Normal router R3 definition 
device=router,10 
#int,IP,mask,dsfield 
if=0,132.10.9.254,24,3 
if=1,132.10.10.100,24,3 
#dest_ip,mask,next_ip,next_interface,link_type 
r_table=132.10.4.0,24,132.10.9.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.5.0,24,132.10.9.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.6.0,24,132.10.9.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.7.0,24,132.10.9.100,1,3 
r_table=132.10.8.0,24,132.10.9.100,1,3 
#default router J1 
r_table=0.0.0.0,24,132.10.10.254,3,3 
Parms = { 
name=b1r10 
Fig.  25.  Normal router R10 definition  
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How to Handle Latency / Loss in the Network 
The ISEAGE testbed and specifically the ISEFLOW routing 
program was not written to allow latency or packet delay.  It was 
programmed so that a packet would be delivered through the routing 
tables to its final destination unless it was sent to a destination IP address 
outside of the testbed IP ranges on a port other than http (80), https (443), 
and ftp (21).  If the packet was destined for the Internet on a port that was 
not allowed, the packet would be dropped with no response back to the 
client making the request.  The concept of latency or delaying packets 
does not exist in ISEFLOW.   
Because CIMoRE needs a way to allow router nodes to decline in 
health state to show a failing system or fail completely, ISEFLOW had to 
be modified to allow latency to be introduced.  This benefits CIMoRE in 
the immediate term, but it also provides functionality to ISEAGE to expand 
its testing ability to more closely replicate true network traffic.  To allow the 
delay to occur in the CIMoRE environment (and the ISEAGE testbed), a 
new queue was created to implement the delay.  This queue was named 
the D_QUEUE and is called from within the ISEFLOW program when the 
global link is defined as being a CIMoRE link or an ISEAGE link with 
delay. 
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Fig.  26.  Traditional way ISEFLOW routes traffic 
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The traditional way that traffic is routed in ISEAGE is depicted in 
Fig. 26.  ISEFLOW uses the route table defined in the configuration file to 
setup the routes in each router.  When a packet arrives on the ingress of a  
router, the header information is read and ISEFLOW looks at the route 
table for the router.  Based upon the destination IP address, ISEFLOW 
determines which interface on the router the packet should be sent out to 
the next hop router or to its final destination router.  Technically, since 
ISEFLOW is implemented in software, the router hops are a queue in 
which the packets are “moved” and TTL incremented with the packet 
being placed in for the final router to read.  While the movement all 
happens within the queue, the packet appears to have moved through a 
physical network when it arrives at the final router or a destination 
computer.   
Fig. 27 shows a high-level picture of how the addition of the 
D_QUEUE has allowed the introduction of delay into the CIMoRE testbed.  
The IP packet still comes to the ingress of the router.  However, the router 
now not only has route table information in it, but there is also information 
provided in the configuration file about what type of traffic is allowed on 
the interface and the connection between two routers.  The global link 
(GLINK) information says what types of traffic are allowed on the 
connections and the DSCPs tell what types of traffic are allowed on the 
interfaces.  ISEFLOW reads this information from the configuration file into 
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memory and also uses it in the route tables.  For this dissertation the 
parameters provided via the GLINK parameters are maximum bandwidth, 
the average bandwidth, and the loss on the connection.   
Also new are multiple D_QUEUEs inside the router.  One 
D_QUEUE is established for each type of traffic the router will be passing.  
In the case of this dissertation there are three D_QUEUEs.  D_QUEUE 1 
processes traffic representing the interstate highway system.  D_QUEUE 
2 handles traffic representing the ICN while D_QUEUE 3 is present for 
traffic representing the electricity network.  Fig. 19 depicts all three 
queues, but the connection from ISEFLOW to D_QUEUE 2 and 
D_QUEUE 3 is drawn as dotted lines to show that for this particular packet 
it is depicting interstate road traffic, but in other packets it could use the 
queue for ICN or electricity traffic.  
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Fig.  27.  D_QUEUE logic allows delay in traffic for ISEFLOW 
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The new processing logic inside the router is shown in Fig. 28.  
When an IP packet arrives on a router ingress, ISEFLOW reads the 
header for destination IP and DSCP.  ISEFLOW determines whether the 
IP is destined for the current router or if it needs to be forwarded.  If the 
packet needs to be forwarded, then it determines which interface it should 
go out.  It then checks the global link information about the router to see 
what the type of traffic that is allowed out that interface.  It then compares 
the global link information to the DSCP to see if the packet is for the 
correct type of critical infrastructure subsector.  If they match, ISEFLOW 
then checks to see if the queue for that critical infrastructure subsector is 
accepting packets and what state the router is in.  If it is failing or 
recovering the ECN value in the packet is changed to match.  Then packet 
is added to the end of the queue for that critical infrastructure subsector 
type where the D_QUEUE program will process.   If D_QUEUE has 
reported failure, then the packet is dropped.   
At CIMoRE startup the D_QUEUE reads the maximum bandwidth, 
the average bandwidths, and the loss from the GLINK values and stores 
the values.  The D_QUEUE then checks to see if there are any new 
values for traffic volume and loss to replace the values that are stored.  
The need for this will be explained in the sections below on traffic 
generation and disruptive events. 
The D_QUEUE then checks to see if the state of the link is up, 
recovering, failing or down based upon the maximum bandwidth, traffic 
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volume, and percent loss.  If the state is down, then the critical 
infrastructure subsector queue will not accept any new packets.  
ISEFLOW is told of the downed state and that no packets should be sent 
to the queue.  If the state is recovering or failing, the D_QUEUE also 
sends that information to ISEFLOW.  Upon receipt, ISEFLOW will change 
the ECN value on the packets before sending the packets to D_QUEUE.   
 If the state is up, the D_QUEUE checks the queue to see if there is 
anything waiting in it.  If there isn’t anything in the queue, then the 
D_QUEUE waits for 100 milliseconds then rechecks the queue.  If there is 
something waiting in the queue, then D_QUEUE checks to see if the 
available bandwidth value is greater than or equal to the size of the packet 
or packet fragment.  This indicates there is bandwidth available to process 
the packet or fragment.  D_QUEUE removes the first packet or fragment 
out of the queue and moves all remaining packets or fragments ahead by 
one position.  Then, the available bandwidth variable is reduced by the 
size of the packet or fragment.  Next, the packet or fragment is sent to 
ISEFLOW and it will send the packet or fragment out the egress interface.  
Once the packet or fragment is handed to ISEFLOW, the variable storing 
the available bandwidth is increased by the size of the packet or fragment.   
The D_QUEUE continuously checks the queue to see if there are 
packing waiting to be processed and if there is enough bandwidth to send 
them back to ISEFLOW to move to the next router.
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Fig.  28. Logic for processing packets in ISEFLOW with D_QUEUE 
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Fig.  29. Logic for processing packets in ISEFLOW with D_QUEUE, continued 
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Generating Traffic for CIMoRE 
At the present time there is neither a directly attached server nor a 
software process that creates a constant flow of traffic entering the 
ISEAGE testbed.  Any traffic in the testbed is generated by the users of 
the testbed.  In the use case of a classroom, the students either build or 
use servers and clients.  Those machines create their own network traffic, 
but there is nothing introduced into the network that represents an 
average load on the system, outsider users, or malicious traffic. 
The addition of a traffic generator is necessary for the operation of 
CIMoRE.  CIMoRE needs a way to have routers receive increasing or 
decreasing amounts of traffic.  The traffic generation could be 
implemented by adding another virtual machine to the ISEAGE testbed 
that generates multiple packets to represent the average traffic.  However, 
a more efficient way to implement the traffic generator is in software that 
starts after ISEFLOW and D_QUEUE are started.  The traffic generator 
creates an IP traffic flow for each critical infrastructure subsector route 
defined in the configuration.  ISEFLOW works at the IP layer, so I can 
manipulate the TCP and Application layers for my own purposes.  The 
generation of traffic packet is discussed below. Traffic flows are created in 
both directions through the subsector networks when modeling critical 
infrastructure subsectors that have two-way traffic in the physical world.  
For example, roads and real network traffic have two-way traffic.  In the 
case of electricity, the IP traffic stream would be one directional.   
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The traffic generator initially reads the average traffic for each 
critical infrastructure subsector and identifies the route for each critical 
infrastructure subsector path from the ISEFLOW configuration file.  It 
generates the packet with the source IP address of the “beginning” router 
in the path and the destination IP address set as the “ending” router in the 
path.  Since it its software running on each board, it can directly put the 
generated traffic packets into the ISEFLOW queue.   
Each traffic packet generated and sent to ISEFLOW will have a 
payload that provides the volume of traffic present on the critical 
infrastructure subsector network at that time.  It also will have the DSCP 
value correctly set to represent the correct critical infrastructure subsector 
traffic.  The ECN value will match the health state of the node.  For 
example, in the startup state with no loss, the ECN value will be 3 which 
means the node is healthy.   
When ISEFLOW receives the traffic generation packet, it reads the 
information stored in the payload for its own uses and also forwards those 
values to the D_QUEUE.  This is shown in Fig. 30.  The D_QUEUE then 
checks the values it has been sent with the average bandwidth and 
percent loss it has stored.  If the values are different, D_QUEUE updates 
the stored values.  The D_QUEUE then continues on as described earlier.  
Traffic volumes that are different from the average traffic and the startup 
percentage loss will come from the disruptive events generated in the web 
front-end and are discussed in the next section.   
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Fig.  30.  Processing logic including traffic generator and disruptive event introduction 
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Fig.  30.  Processing logic including traffic generator and disruptive event introduction, continued
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Introducing Disruptive Events 
ISEAGE already has a web-based front-end to manage the 
restarting of the ISEFLOW on each board.  This management tool lives on 
Snowflake and is controlled by the “developer” Scrat.  Currently, the tool 
only displays the health of Boards 1-5, facilitates restarting the ISEFLOW 
on each board, allows a single board to be rebooted, or reboots all five 
boards.  This is shown in Fig. 32 and 33.      
  
  
Fig.  31.  Current web-based front-end to restart ISEFLOW and/or board(s)  
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  The web-based front-end already uses the ISEFLOW 
configuration file to display health information about the end node routers 
(outside routers in ISEAGE terminology) on each of the boards and issues 
the command to restart ISEFLOW and the boards.  It would be relatively 
simple to modify this tool to create disruptive events which would modify 
the values that ISEFLOW has for each router and then to issue the restart 
ISEFLOW and/or restart the board(s) command.   
Fig.  32.  Current web-based front-end to show the status of the end node routers  
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As shown in Fig. 34 the web tool will be modified to have a visual 
depiction of each interface on each router.  The visualization will be 
simple.  They will be colored cells.  The green cell stands for healthy, the 
orange cell for failing and going down, the yellow cell for recovering from 
failure, and the red cell for completely failed.  The web front-end also has 
two texts boxes behind each interface of each router.  The first text box 
will allow the entry of a numeric value for traffic volume.  The average 
volume, as well as traffic volume thresholds for up, down, failing, and 
recovering will be listed so the user has an idea of how to change the 
traffic volume for the desired disruptive event.  The second text box only 
Fig.  33.  Prototype of disruptive event web tool 
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allows a numeric value between 0 and 100, inclusive.  This is the 
percentage of packet loss.   
 Once the values are filled out in the web tool and the submit button 
is pressed, the web tool sends the new values for traffic volume and 
percent loss to the traffic generator as shown in Fig. 30.  The traffic 
generator then writes those values to be used for all future packets until it 
receives a new change notice.  Once it records these new values, it 
creates a special traffic generation packet using the new values and sends 
it to ISEFLOW.  
ISEFLOW takes two actions.  First, it forwards the packet to 
D_QUEUE.  It is at this point in the D_QUEUE process where the value 
D_QUEUE has stored for traffic volume and loss are compared to the new 
incoming values and theses values are written for future use and also 
used to calculate available bandwidth.   
Second, ISEFLOW modifies the running version of ISEFLOW to 
include the new values for the router interfaces in the traffic generation 
packet.  ISEFLOW also recognizes any routers that are downstream of the 
affected router and changes their values in the running configuration as 
well.   
While the traffic generator continues to put normal IP packets into 
the “beginning” router with the ECN value set at 3 meaning healthy, as 
soon as the packet arrives at a failing node, the packet is rewritten by 
ISEFLOW to include a 1 as the value in the ECN field so that anyone 
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observing the traffic will see the router beginning to fail.  While these 
packets are not used in this dissertation, they could be used in the future 
for a visual map of the system to show the nodes failing to the anyone 
observing the modeling, but not in control of manipulating the disruptive 
event.   
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CHAPTER 7. RUNNING CIMORE 
There are five different states of CIMoRE.  Each of them are 
defined below.   
Initial Startup   
The initial startup state begins when ISEFLOW is started and it 
reads the configuration file.  The network is built with all routers correctly 
identified and “physically” connected to the appropriate interfaces.  The 
average and maximum bandwidth, as well as the percentage loss, has 
been set on each router interface.  For this discussion, the loss in the 
initial startup state is 0.  The different global links could be set with a loss 
at startup to simulate the critical infrastructure subsector nodes in a failed 
state at startup.  However, starting with no loss allows me to discuss each 
state of CIMoRE.  The D_QUEUE is started after ISEFLOW is running and 
before the traffic generator.  Once ISEFLOW and D_QUEUE have been 
started, the routers are sitting idle waiting for traffic to arrive.  Next, the 
traffic generator software is started and begins putting traffic information 
packets into the CIMoRE network.  The traffic packets have average traffic 
volume and 0 percent loss.   
Steady State 
Once the first traffic generation packet has been received by the 
“end” router for each critical infrastructure subsector in the defined path, 
CIMoRE is considered to be in a steady state.  In steady state, normal IP 
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traffic which could be generated by end users or devices connected to end 
node routers can start sending their traffic.  Also, the traffic generator 
continues to put traffic packets into each critical infrastructure subsector 
network.  Again, those packets represent the average traffic volume and 
that they are operating as healthy nodes.  This can be verified by looking 
at the web front-end which has a colored square indicating that each node 
is green.  It also can be observed by doing a tcpdump and viewing the DS 
field for DSCP and ECN values.   
Introduction of Disruptive Events 
For right now the introduction of a disruptive event is a manual 
process using the web tool described above.  Once the traffic volume 
and/or a loss percentage is entered and the submit button on the web 
front-end is pressed, the new values are sent to the traffic generator.  The 
traffic generator then stores the new values and crafts a special traffic 
packet that includes the new traffic volume and percent loss values.  The 
traffic packet is sent to ISEFLOW.  ISEFLOW forwards the information to 
the D_QUEUE where it is used to recalculate available bandwidth.  
ISEFLOW also modifies the running version of itself to include the new 
values for the router interfaces in the traffic generation packet.  ISEFLOW 
also recognizes any routers that are downstream of the affected router 
and changes their values in the running configuration as well.  The colored 
square on the web front-end will reflect any changes to the health state of 
the router interface.   
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In the future it will be possible for a disruptive event to be 
introduced automatically from the reading of a file that stores data about a 
series of disruptive events.  This idea is further discussed in the future 
work section of this dissertation.      
Failure  
There are two ways to achieve complete failure for a node.  The 
first as described in the section on traffic generation.  It would rely on 
introducing traffic generation packets that would reduce bandwidth on the 
route.  If enough packets get delayed it can cause the D_QUEUE in the 
router to stop accepting packets.  Therefore, the node has failed because 
arriving new packets in ISEFLOW cannot be serviced.    
The second way of failure would be selecting 100 percent loss in 
the traffic generator web front-end and pressing submit.  This would have 
ISEFLOW reload the running configuration with the traffic volume equaling 
the maximum bandwidth.  This is the kind of failure that would be 
introduced with the electricity subsector.  The routers either are up or 
down in the electricity subsector.  There is no percentage loss in an 
electricity subsector network.   
Recovery 
As with failure, there are two ways to recovery for a router.  The 
first would be if the D_QUEUE begins to catch up with the IP packets 
being sent.  Because it stopped accepting packets, it could then process 
all it has in the queue and begin to signal ISEFLOW that it can now send 
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packets again to it.  This would mean that the traffic generator’s web front-
end would display the color of yellow showing a recovery mode.  Also, the 
normal network traffic that moves beyond the recovering node would be 
marked with a 2 to show that the state is recovering, but still not operating 
at a healthy state.  The D_QUEUE would begin allowing normal network 
packets to be submitted to it again as well. 
The second way to recover is by marking the router as fully 
recovered in the traffic generator web front-end and pressing submit.  
Once the submission is made and ISEFLOW is restarted the router would 
operate in a healthy state.   
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A fully functioning CIMoRE is a very large project that falls well 
outside the scope of a dissertation project.  The first step in any very large 
project is the creation of a road map of how the project could be 
undertaken.  That was the purpose of this dissertation.  My contribution to 
the CIMoRE project is trying to determine if the project really is possible 
and then creating a framework in which development could occur.  This 
dissertation recognized many problems with using the ISEAGE testbed 
and identified solutions for how to overcome the problems.  I also outlined 
development that needs to be completed in ISEAGE to allow CIMoRE to 
operate.  The implementation of many of the items I outlined could 
become their own Masters level implementation project and move 
CIMoRE toward full functionality.   
Specifically, in this dissertation I demonstrated that critical 
infrastructures subsectors can be analyzed and pieces of those 
subsectors in the physical world can be used to create a network 
representation using TCP/IP networks.  Additionally, there are physical 
characteristics of the subsectors in the real world that can be used as a 
proxy for IP traffic.  Further, once enumerated, the interdependencies (or 
relationships) between critical infrastructure subsectors can be translated 
to network terms and modeled in the TCP/IP testbed.   
All of these transformations would have been significantly easier if 
cooperators in each of the three critical infrastructure subsectors could 
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have been found to provide data and help identify key characteristics of 
each critical infrastructure subsector.  However, my proof of concept data 
was a legitimate substitute. 
While generating data for three critical infrastructure subsectors 
and determining how to create network nodes and traffic was thought 
provoking, the largest number of tasks and the most challenging was to 
determine all the modifications that needed to be made in ISEAGE to 
allow CIMoRE to operate.  First, ISEAGE had to understand that in this 
dissertation the traffic in the testbed was comprised of three different types 
of service.  One type of service would run for each critical infrastructure 
subsector in the test.  That was accomplished by using the Differentiated 
Service field.   
Next, the number and function of routers used in ISEFLOW, the 
internal programming of ISEAGE, need to be expanded.  In addition to the 
two existing router types of normal router and edge node router, two more 
types of routers were defined:  connector node router and junction node 
router.  Connector node routers allow the implement of the functionality of 
a switch in ISEAGE while the junction node routers allow 
interdependencies to be model.  Specifically, in this dissertation the 
geospatial interdependency was used.   
Historically ISEAGE has only used two or one normal routers 
between the Backplane and the end node routers where the students 
work.  Because of the sheer number of routers in the three critical 
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infrastructure subsectors and the introduction of two new types of routers, 
a full configuration file was created.  To demonstrate how each of the 
types of routers were used detailed examples from the full configuration 
file were included in the dissertation. 
Further, ISEAGE has never handled latency in a network.  Packets 
were routed without any delay.  However, for CIMoRE it was necessary to 
introduce delay into packet delivery.  To handle delay, the logic for a new 
piece of software to be called from ISEFLOW was developed.  This delay 
queue was named D_QUEUE.   
Traffic generation is also a missing feature in the current 
implementation of ISEAGE.  The ability to increase or decrease the 
amount of traffic sent to a network path allows the D_QUEUE to introduce 
delay into the network.  The traffic generation also allows ISEFLOW to 
modify its running configuration so that packets are marked with ECN 
codes of failing or recovery, as well as routers can be marked as in total 
failure.  The modification of an existing web tool that monitors and restarts 
ISEAGE routers and boards allows the introduction of disruptive events.  
Coupled with the traffic generator, the disruptive event can trigger a failure 
in routers based upon information sent by ISEFLOW and D_QUEUE. 
Finally, after the modifications to ISEAGE were outlined, the five 
running states of CIMoRE were explained.  How to use each of the new 
pieces of ISEAGE, as well as how to introduce disruptive events, how to 
fail a node, and how to recover were included.   
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The framework presented in this dissertation is just the beginning of 
much more work for other graduate students, as well as myself, before a 
useful tool for critical infrastructure subsector modeling can be provided 
for disaster planners and table top exercises.  The most immediate work 
that should be undertaken is the writing of all the modifications to ISEAGE 
that I outlined.  Without those modifications, it does not matter how many 
cooperators and real data sets are collected for use.  In tandem with the 
ISEAGE modifications, making contacts and circulating a white paper on 
CIMoRE’s proof of concept would help in earning cooperator’s trust and, 
hopefully, real data. 
Another step in CIMoRE’s development would be to add a fourth 
critical infrastructure subsector and to do the work to identify its physical 
components that could be turned into a network representation and 
network traffic.  A logical next step critical infrastructure subsector might 
be drinking water systems or wastewater treatment systems.  It would 
need to be determined if one or both of these function like the electricity 
subsector, the roads, or information technology subsector, or if they are 
unique and have their own values that need to be established.   
While only the geospatial interdependencies where considered in 
this dissertation, it would seem wise to look at another of the 
interdependencies to see if they could be modeled using the junction node 
router and what that traffic would look like.  They may fit seamlessly into 
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the existing framework, but there could be additional modifications needed 
in ISEAGE or to the logic of handling junction node router traffic. 
All of the creation of files and data for this dissertation was 
generated by hand.  One of the major drawbacks of implementing more 
than the small configuration used in this dissertation is the need for 
elaborate networking schemes and decisions about network connections.  
The setup and implementation of a CIMoRE model in ISEAGE needs to 
be automated.  There needs to be a way that data file garnered from the 
cooperators could be read in and the determination of whether the node is 
a normal router, an edge node router, a junction node router, or a 
connector node router would be based upon the fields extracted from the 
cooperator’s database.  
Likewise, the generation of disruptive events is a manual process at 
this time.  However, in the future a file with the values needed for the 
traffic generator could be loaded into ISEAGE and the web front-end tool 
would just provide secondary management of the routers and display of 
the health states.  This would allow the replay of disruptive events from a 
file or a series of events to be played out over time. The reading of the 
data stream could even be a historical recording of an event or data 
coming from real-time from sensors in the physical world. CIMoRE could 
also include a recording of traffic feature so that exercises could be 
replayed and evaluated for the decisions made.  And, CIMoRE could 
provide information about alternate path for rerouting traffic.  As nodes fail, 
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CIMoRE could forecast alternate paths and provide a calculated best fit 
alternative.  
The determination of the interdependencies, in this case geospatial, 
needs to be implemented in software.  The longitude and latitude values 
are available, but the overlaying of the state map and the locating of the 
nodes in the same cell should be automated.  The enumeration of other 
interdependencies should also be automated with software.  
A very far out consideration is to make ISEAGE IPv6 compliant. 
This was not discussed in the dissertation because this is very far afield 
from the scope of this project.  However, as the world continues to move 
toward IPv6 or at least a world that runs both IPv4 and IPv6, it would be 
prudent for ISEAGE have IPv6 be added as an option to be enabled when 
the testbed is being used.   
One final consideration for future work is that when modeling more 
than three critical infrastructure subsector paths, many of the routers will 
no longer be normal routers.  In fact, they may become junction node 
routers.  And, those junction node routers may make be so interconnected 
that CIMoRE becomes a mesh network.  The addition of using a mesh 
network may require a few additional modifications to the ISEAGE code 
that I have not considered for this dissertation, but may need to be 
revisited in the future.   
Converting critical infrastructure subsectors to TCP/IP networks is a 
novel concept in its own right.  However, not only is CIMoRE a novelty, but 
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when fully implemented it has the potential to be a useful modeling tool for 
critical infrastructures subsectors and their interdependencies.  There is 
much development left to do to get to this point.  I’m proud to say this 
dissertation laid the groundwork for such a tool. 
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APPENDIX. OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
This appendix provides two tables to show which of the 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors could potentially be modeled in the future using 
CIMoRE.  CIMoRE requires critical infrastructure subsectors to have 
characteristics that can be used to create a network.  Because not all 16 
of the critical infrastructure sectors have clearly delineated processes and 
procedures some cannot be depicted as networks.  Therefore, the 16 
critical infrastructures were categorized into one of three types; yes, 
maybe, and no. 
“Lifeline” Sectors - Yes 
There are six critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S. that are 
categorized as “lifeline” sectors.  These sectors focused on public health 
and safety issues.  These critical infrastructure sectors include the three 
used in this dissertation:  transportation systems, information technology, 
and energy.  In addition, water and wastewater systems, communications 
and healthcare and public health are included in the “lifeline” critical 
sectors.  Of these sectors, CIMoRE can model all but healthcare and 
public health.  And, if looking closely at the specific subsector of electronic 
records and information movement in healthcare and public health, 
CIMoRE could fit all of the “lifeline” critical infrastructure sectors.
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Table 4.  "Lifeline" critical infrastructure sectors – yes category 
Sector Subsector Network Network 
Segments 
Devices Bandwidth Loss 
Communications Data Fiber loop City Router Actual 
bandwidth 
Percentage 
Energy Electricity Transmission 
line 
City City  Line voltage On/off 
Information 
Technology 
Identify 
management 
/ Trust 
systems 
Trust support 
systems 
Trusted 
partners 
Validation 
objects 
Actual 
bandwidth 
On/off 
Transportation 
Systems 
Highway 
systems 
Roads Link segment Interchanges Volume of 
traffic 
Percentage 
Water and 
Wastewater 
Systems 
Drinking 
water 
treatment 
facility 
Treatment 
process 
Movement 
from raw 
water storage 
to distribution 
Where the 
product 
changes  
Volume of 
water treated 
per hour or 
volume of 
water 
distributed per 
hour 
Percentage 
Healthcare and 
Public Health 
Electronic 
health records 
Provider 
networks, 
pharmacy 
networks 
Physical 
office 
locations 
Medical 
records 
systems 
Number of 
records or 
number of 
transactions 
Percentage 
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“Manufacturing-like” Sectors - Maybe 
The second category of critical infrastructure sectors are sectors 
that start with a raw product, go through some number of processes to 
end with a final product.  Although the chemical and critical manufacturing 
sectors easily fall into this category, the food and agriculture sector could 
also be considered “manufacturing-like” if I consider seeds, fertilizer, and 
chemicals as the input with a raw product as the harvested crop and the 
final product the cereal or food product created from the crop.  The 
“manufacturing-like” sectors may be able to be modeled by CIMoRE if it 
models the movement from input to final product.   
Similar to the flow of a raw product through a manufacturing 
process is the information sharing that occurs in critical infrastructure 
sectors such as the defense industrial base and the emergency services.  
The movement of information being shared among divisions or branches 
of each of these critical infrastructure sectors could potentially be modeled 
by CIMoRE with some more detailed knowledge of how messages flow.
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Table 5.  "Manufacturing-like" critical infrastructures – maybe category 
Sector Subsector Network Network 
Segments 
Devices Bandwidth Loss 
Chemical Agricultural 
chemicals 
Raw 
materials 
into final 
product 
One form to 
another 
Custody 
change, sale, 
refinement  
Volume of 
raw materials, 
transported, 
capacity of 
manufacturing 
line 
Percentage 
Critical 
Manufacturing 
Primary 
metals 
manufacturing 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Food and 
Agriculture 
“farm to fork” From seed 
to harvest to 
refinement 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Same as 
above 
Defense 
Industrial Base 
Information 
sharing 
among 
divisions 
Division or 
department 
One division 
to multiple 
divisions 
Centralized 
communication 
for division 
Bandwidth, 
people 
Percentage 
Emergency 
Services 
Information 
sharing 
among 
services 
Service or 
department 
Firemen to 
police to 
medical 
Centralized 
communication 
for service 
department 
Bandwidth, 
people 
Percentage 
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Other – No 
The remaining critical infrastructures do not have characteristics 
that allow them to be modeled as a network.  The remaining five are 
commercial facilities, dams, financial services, government facilities, and 
nuclear reactors, material, and waste.    
